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> Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Inset photo courtesy of Cpl. Ryan Tomlinson

# AGENDA

## Introduction

## Solution Overview

### **Solution Components**

Implementation

## Conclusion



 Photo Courtesy of Cpl. Ryan Tomlinson

# THE NEED IS REAL

# Traditional high assurance solutions are lacking for contemporary defense communications applications

*"[Commercial Mobile Devices ] CMD (e.g. smartphones, e-readers, tablets, etc.) offer unprecedented opportunities for advanced mobile computing and communications." \** 

"The increasing use of social media, smartphones and tablet computers has made information sharing an expectation. This expectation requires new capabilities, particularly in the "edge" or tactical environments that have limited availability to persistent, high speed connections." \*

# Contemporary Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) Devices are not secure

"The Defense IA Security Accreditation Working Group (DSAWAG), which adjudicates community risk and approves Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), recently reviewed a CMD Operating System and determined these devices are not yet suitable for wide-scale DoD deployment." \*



\*Use of Commercial Mobile Devices (CMD) in the Department of Defense (DoD) T. M. Takai, DoD CIO April 06, 2011

# THE THREAT IS REAL

Mobile phones are the primary communications device for many

• Especially true for high ranking officials and executives

## Vulnerabilities to mobile phones are increasing

- Practical Cellphone Spying, (DEFCON 18, Jul 30 Aug 1, 2010), <u>http://defcon.org/html/links/dc-archives/dc-18-archive.html</u>
- Live demonstration of GSM phone call interception for <\$1500</li>

Technology for adversaries is ever more readily available

 Secret Mobile Phone Codes Cracked: A German computer scientist has published details of the secret code used to protect the conversations of more than 4bn mobile phone users. (BBC News Dec-09)

#### Monday, January 31, 2011 The Cell Phone Security Threat


The majority of large and medium businesses are failing to adequately protect themselves against the growing threat of mobile voice call interception;...

"Effective email security has become routine but our research shows most businesses do not apply anything like the same level of robust security to cell phone calls. Companies that do not respond are exposing themselves to attack."

Source: ABI Research



# **FINDING THE BALANCE**




#### ASSURED MOBILE ENVIRONMENT






## **A COMPLETE SOLUTION**





## FOUR FOUNDATIONAL TENETS





# **2010 FEASIBILITY STUDY**

Is there an optimal commercial platform or OS?

Is it feasible to implement a high assurance Suite B cryptoprocessor in a micro SD format?

Which commercial platform or OS offers the richest user experience?

Can PKI be used effectively in spite of the potential size of a mobile network? Base design on a COTS mobile platform

Support large scale manageability ANCHOR

security in

hardware

Separate

untrusted

components

from trusted


Is it feasible for the module to be non-CCI?

Can the OS be trusted to keep applications separated and protect I/O streams?

Can mobile devices be securely managed from a control center in the network? Is virtualization needed? What is the optimal virtualization technology?



#### Not Just an Encryption Module or Application Software!



#### **DRIVING THE REQUIREMENTS**

#### **Functionality:**

- ✓ Secure VoIP Phone Calls
- ✓ Secure Data Connectivity
- ✓ Secure Voice and Email Apps
- ✓ Security API for Customer Apps
- ✓ Support for Non-Secure Voice and Apps
- ✓ Secure Device Management

#### **Primary Security Considerations:**

- ✓ Software Integrity
- ✓ Fail-Safe Design Virtualized Process Separation
- ✓ Design Assurance Security Critical Components Evaluated
- ✓ Physical Security Tamper-Resistant Key and Algorithm Storage Environmental Exception Detectors
- ✓ Secure Key Management





#### **Environment:**

- ✓ Latest COTS Devices
- ✓ COTS-like Product Cost
- ✓ Open Platform for Secure Applications
- ✓ High Assurance Crypto



## **ENTERPRISE GRADE DEVICES**










- Windows Mobile
- Biometric Reader, GPS
- CDMA plus GSM in one device
- IP42, MIL810G
- Extended lifecycle support

KNOWLEDGE USER Secure Voice and Data Mobility

- Enhanced Android<sup>™</sup> OS
- Extended accessory ecosystem
- IP54 sealed, MIL810G
- Replaceable battery
- Extended lifecycle support

TASK ORIENTED USERS Secure Application Access





# **CRYPTR micro OVERVIEW**



#### **Micro-SD Form Factor**

Designed for use in Commercial-off-the-Shelf
 Smartphones

#### Hardware Based Security

- Tamper Protection
- Supports Encryption & Key Management
- Secure Credential Store
- Hardware based Random Number Generation (RNG)

#### FIPS 140-2 and Suite B Cryptography

- FIPS 140 Planned Complete 4Q11
- Designed with high assurance requirements in mind



# **CRYPTR micro CAPABILITIES**

#### Capabilities

- Encipher/decipher symmetric
- Encipher/decipher asymmetric
- Cryptographic Enveloping
- Sign data/verify signatures
- X.509v3 Certificate and key pair storage
- Key Generation
- X.509v3 Certificate and Key Pair Update
- X.509v3 Certificate Validation
- Random Number Generation
- Key Establishment Operations
- Key Derivation
- Hashing and HMAC



# **CRYPTR micro MANAGEMENT**

#### **Certificate/Key Management**

- Generates and stores a device-unique signed X.509v3 Elliptic-Curve certificate.
- No private key import functionality.
- Validates another device's unique public key during an authentication process
- Supports import of the root CA certificate
- Supports export of the public key for certification
- Supports importing of device-unique certificate
- Supports certificate revocation.



# **CRYPTR micro ACCESS**

#### **Policy Management**

- Policy is enforced through configuration of the CRYPTR micro
- All configuration data stored in the CRYPTR micro is stored in a single database under an administrator password
- The privileges are not configurable by either the user or the administrator


#### PIN/Token

- Administrator access is allowed via an external host connected through the SDIO interface (factory device, Smartphone)
- The CRYPTR micro has one Administrator and one User account with configurable passwords.
- Strong passwords are enforced




# **CRYPTR micro EMBEDMENT**

- The software stack exposes the CRYPTR micro's functions and services through a crypto library API.
- Usable directly with little change to applications currently using industry standard APIs and toolkits.








## AME HYPERVISOR DOMAIN SEPARATION


Separates untrusted components from trusted ones.

The hypervisor is proven to work on several ARM processors.

The hypervisor is small, (about 80Kbytes) making it amiable to analysis.

Based on academic work focused on a provable security model.








#### Motorola Solutions' Secure Mobile Architecture


- Virtualization solution ("Hypervisor") separates the OS from hardware to enable a trusted COTS device for secure applications
  - Isolates red and black cells-- applications
     environments
  - · Controls access to peripherals
- CRYPTR micro Crypto engine provides trusted crypto operation and key storage
  - Secure key handling methods
  - Data at rest protection provisions
  - Real-time integrity checking & tamper protection





CRYPTR micro Module





#### **Mobility Services Platform v3**



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#### Designed for easy navigation and workflow


Wizard-like tools help answer: "What's the next logical step in the workflow?"

Mobility Services Pla	tform	١							Welcome admin   VM02   Version 3.2
🚯 🔠 Staging 🌐 Provisioning 🦹 Control 🧃 Library 🧟 Admin 🚍 Transfer 📳 Status 😨 Preferences 🚳 Builder									
Start Page									
Device Search: Device ID V Sign Dut									Customize Sign Out Help
Start Page									
Device Status			Ż	<b>;</b> 0	Enterprise Objects		\$ <mark>}</mark> 0	Admin Setup	9 😔
Device Status Summary					Name	Count	Last Update	Record License	
status.missing	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	5	5	Users	<u>11</u>	2/23/2009 2:32:00 PM	🌂 <u>Create Site</u>	
status.orphaned	<u>0</u>	Ŭ	5	5	Sites	<u>7</u>	2/23/2009 3:57:00 PM	🂐 <u>Create Relay Server</u>	
	-		<u>×</u>	-	Relay Servers	<u>7</u>	2/20/2009 10:15:00 AM	🌂 <u>Create User</u>	
					SMS Carriers	<u>0</u>			
Relay Server Status			Ŕ,	<b>-</b>				Operations Setup	9 😔
					Content Objects		729⊝	Nuclear Package	
Relay Server Status					Name	Count	Last Update	A Create Action	
Relay Servers	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	Packages	27	2/20/2009 1:05:00 PM	🂐 Create Bundle	
					Settings	<u>10</u>	2/20/2009 10:33:00 AM	Create Collection Request	
					Bundles	<u>19</u>	2/20/2009 10:47:00 AM	Create Condition	
Site Status		6	Z 📝	<del>@</del> 🖯	Conditions	<u>0</u>		🌂 <u>Create Message Set</u>	
Site Status					Message Sets	0		Create Policy	
NewZealand.Northisland.Auckland							· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Create Profile	
Devices: 4					Operations Objects		\$ <mark>\$</mark> 0	A <u>Create Setting</u>	




#### CONTROL

Proactive management and optimization allows IT to identify potential application, network or device issues — before your users are affected






#### **POWERFUL AND SIMPLE IT ARCHITECTURE**



## KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROVEN CAPABILITY






## AME SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION




# **AME SECURE VOICE**



ES400 Enterprise Digital Assistant	CRYPTR micro Crypto Module	Apriva Voice
<ul> <li>A modern, secure,</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Hardware based</li></ul>	<ul> <li>VoIP over Packet Data</li> <li>SCIP and DTLS/SRTP</li> <li>Interoperable with existing</li></ul>
commercial smartphone <li>GSM + CDMA World-</li>	cryptography <li>FIPS140-2 and Suite B</li>	SCIP secure devices &
phone. <li>Windows Mobile 6.5.3</li>	capable	terminals

# **ANDROID AME**





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# **MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS**

#### COMMERCIAL MOBILE DEVICES REQUIREMENTS\*

#### ASSURED MOBILE ENVIRONMENT

• ACCESS O	CONTROL	
<ul> <li>DoD approved identification and authentication to the mobile is required</li> </ul>	✓ CRYPTR micro hardware based user identification / authentication.	
<ul> <li>CMDs should employ approved user credentials to authenticate to DoD web servers, collaboration tools and data files.</li> </ul>	✓ Standard CRYPTR micro API allows authenticated users to make use of trusted applications and secure web access.	
• DATA PRO	OTECTION O	
<ul> <li>All sensitive DoD data both in transit and at rest is required to be encrypted using a FIPS validated module.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>✓ Cryptography and key storage supplied by CRYPTR micro hardware.</li> <li>✓ Hardware based password protection of all</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Decryption requires successful entry of a password.</li> </ul>	cryptographic services.	
<ul> <li>When a screen lock occurs (user initiated or due to inactivity timeout) all data will be re-encrypted.</li> </ul>	✓ Trusted User Interface and data management applications.	
•The system administrator shall have Remote Data protection capability though the use of a Data Wipe or Data Obfuscation command to the handheld.	<ul><li>✓ Data storage protected by the hypervisor.</li><li>✓ MSP3 provides full remote management capability.</li></ul>	



\*Use of Commerical Mobile Devices (CMD) in the Department of Defense (DoD) T. M. Takai, DoD CIO April 06, 2011

## **MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS**

#### COMMERCIAL MOBILE DEVICES REQUIREMENTS\*

#### ASSURED MOBILE ENVIRONMENT

# ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT Devices must be managed and controlled by an enterprise management system. This includes capability to configure the device browser during provisioning; capability of performing a device audit. Devices must prevent user override of security configurations. Base security policy on the CRYPTR micro set at the factory and can not be changed. Mobile device policies set and managed remotely by MSP3 Hypervisor prevents unauthorized user access.

DoD PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI) (CREDENTIALS)
 Devices must implement DoD PKI standards or approved authentication credentials.
 Email on CMDs will be capable of using public key enabled digital certificates for authentication between devices and the server.
 CRYPTR micro Can store credentials and act as an embedded CAC.
 Standard CRYPTR micro API allows authenticated users to make use of approved email applications.



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## **MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS**

#### COMMERCIAL MOBILE DEVICES REQUIREMENTS\*

#### ASSURED MOBILE ENVIRONMENT

SOFTWARE A	PPLICATIONS O
<ul> <li>Software and applications must be installed from an approved source</li> <li>A trusted loading process including Over The Air (OTA) provisioning must include mutual authentication, data confidentiality, integrity and availability between the provisioning server and device.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Hardware based signature validation</li> <li>Hypervisor protects trusted load process</li> <li>Standard CRYPTR micro API allows full hardware based cryptographic services to be used by a trusted load application</li> </ul>
• TRAI	NING



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# THANK YOU